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The United States and Afghan Northern Alliance forces toppled the Taliban 
government in 2001 in the early months of Operation Enduring Freedom with relative 
ease. Beginning in 2002, however, the Taliban and a number of other groups1 launched a 
sustained campaign to overthrow the government of Afghanistan and force the 
withdrawal of U.S. and coalition forces.2 Within a year, the Taliban and other insurgent 
groups had expanded into areas of eastern and southern Afghanistan, taking advantage of 
the central government’s failure to extend governance to the country’s rural areas.3 Large 
unit operations undertaken early by the United States to destroy insurgent forces yielded 
mixed results, and anti-government forces continued to grow.4 By 2006, the Afghan 
government faced a full-blown insurgency.5  
Despite increased U.S. troop levels in the country, the insurgency in Afghanistan 
has proved remarkably strong and adaptable. Today, insurgents continue to engage in 
low-intensity warfare against NATO and Afghan troops, as well as in the targeted 
assassination of government officials. The security situation remains tenuous; a United 
Nations report from this year estimates that more than 3,000 civilians were killed in the 
war in 2011, the fifth year in a row that number had increased.6 Moreover, doubts about 
the legitimacy of the Afghan government persist. In January 2009, President Hamid 
Karzai’s approval rating hovered at 52 percent, down 31 percentage points from his 
highest approval rating in 2005.7 Allegations of electoral fraud related to Karzai’s 
                                                            
1 In addition to the Taliban movement, insurgent forces included the so-called “Haqqani network” and 
2 Jones 2008, 33.  
3 Ibid., 15.  
4 Mansoor 2006, 78.  
5 Jones 2008, 7.  
6 Magnowski 2012.  
7 ABC News 2009.  
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reelection in late 2009 further contributed to the leader’s declining popularity. The 
insurgency in Afghanistan also continues to benefit from outside funding and support as 
well as sanctuary in Pakistan. 
Recognizing the futility of early operations focused on targeting the enemy 
directly, the United States and its allies embarked on a population-centric 
counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign starting in 2006, which focused on enabling and 
supporting the Afghan government’s efforts to defeat the insurgency.8 The population-
centric approach, which the United States and coalition forces continue to pursue to this 
day, is laid out clearly in 2006’s FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency, a collaborative effort 
between the U.S. Army and the U.S. Marine Corps that was strongly influenced by the 
classical theorists, most notably French Army officer David Galula. Today’s dominant 
population-centric COIN paradigm maintains that the population constitutes the key 
battleground in the competition between insurgent and counterinsurgent; each side fights 
to get the people to accept its governance or authority as legitimate.9 According to 
advocates of the contemporary population-centric approach, “Victory will be gained 
when [isolation of the insurgents from their cause and support] is maintained by the 
people’s active support.”10 
One hallmark of the United States’ population-centric strategy in Afghanistan has 
been the development of specialized teams tasked with engaging local populations. One 
such team is the Female Engagement Team (FET), which the military first developed in 
2009 to overcome cultural barriers to access Afghan females, a previously untouchable 
segment of the Afghan population. The job of the all-female teams is to engage local 
                                                            
8 Ken and Smith 2011, 1. 
9 FM 3-24, 2006.  
10 Cohen et al. 2006, 50. 
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women, and at times men and children, in support of battle owners’ counterinsurgency 
objectives. The FET mission statement has undergone many modifications, but can 
currently be summarized as follows: influence the population through persistent and 
consistent interaction to create stability and security.  
For its relatively small size, the program has received an enormous amount of 
attention and praise. While the teams are frequently heralded as a success both in military 
circles and in the media, I contend that assertions that the FET program has been a 
success are problematic. The FET program has been promoted and defended as a critical 
element of population-centric counterinsurgency that separates the insurgency from the 
population on which it depends for support, but there has been no meaningful assessment 
from which one can make conclusions about the contribution of the teams as a COIN 
tool.  
Specifically, I argue that current assessment models for the FET program are 
insufficient in two respects. First, while the military has collected a significant amount of 
data on their independent variable—the activities FETs have done to engage the Afghan 
population—they have failed to gather in any systematic fashion data that connect the 
actions of the teams to the mechanisms of population-centric COIN through which they 
are believed to operate. In particular, the military has not convincingly shown that the 
outreach conducted by the teams influences women and their communities to stop 
enabling the insurgency and instead support coalition forces and the Government of 
Afghanistan (GIRoA). Second, the military has failed to establish a causal link between 
FETs and successful outcomes, most notably, a decrease in insurgency violence. In the 
absence of sound assessment on which to draw, proponents of the program have relied 
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heavily upon untested assumptions, sometimes problematic, about the impact of FET 
engagements among the population, as well as the relevance of those engagements for 
meeting the goal of weakening the insurgency, to conclude that the program has been a 
success.  
My argument raises an additional question: why is it that assessment models are 
so poorly developed? I argue that cultural-psychological explanations and bureaucratic 
politics explanations help us understand the current assessment model for the teams. One 
possible reason for the current model of assessment is that those evaluating the FET 
program are confident that the effectiveness of the population-centric COIN approach has 
been proven; accordingly, programs that correspond to that model can be assumed to be 
working. Bureaucratic politics explanations may also serve to explain assessment 
practices: measuring inputs is seen as a way to secure both funding and prestige. I also 
explore why proponents of the program face unique incentives to make hasty conclusions 
about the success of the FET program even if they recognize the deficiencies of the 
current assessment model.  
This thesis proceeds as follows. The next section provides an overview of the 
Marine Corps and Army Female Engagement Team programs. Afterwards, I introduce 
the strategic justifications for the FET concept provided by its advocates. Based on these 
justifications, I develop a simple model to shed light on how the teams are believed to 
operate. I then describe how the Marine and Army teams have been assessed to date. 
Next, I identify problems associated with the current model of assessment for the 
program. I conclude by offering potential explanations for the persistent problems in the 
FET assessment model. 
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CHAPTER I: Female Engagement in the Context of Population-Centric 
Counterinsurgency 
 
Development of Counterinsurgency Theory and the FET program  
 
Contemporary population-centric COIN theory contends that the population, not 
enemy forces, represents the decisive battleground in the competition between insurgent 
and counterinsurgent. Mobilizing the population, the so-called “neutral” majority11, is 
thus the primary struggle in an internal war.12 The population-centric approach can be 
contrasted with the enemy-centric approach, or “direct approach,” which prioritizes 
kinetic activities aimed at killing or capturing insurgents.13 Adherents to population-
centric COIN doctrine do not argue that enemy forces should be ignored altogether. In 
fact, the Field Manual articulates the need for the elimination of enemy forces to establish 
early control over an assigned area.14 What distinguishes population-centric COIN theory 
from enemy-centric COIN theory is its assertion that the enemy should not be given the 
same level of emphasis as the population by counterinsurgents. The enemy-centric 
approach is flawed, argues the Field Manual, because killing every insurgent is virtually 
impossible and most insurgencies can replace losses rapidly.15 Moreover, enemy-centric 
operations can breed resentment among the population, potentially creating more 
insurgents through every attempt to eliminate the enemy.   
FM 3-24’s assertion that the population is the prize is strongly influenced by the 
classical theorists of counterinsurgency, most notably French Army officer David Galula 
and British military officer Robert Thompson. Both authors argue that insurgents must 
                                                            
11 Galula 1964, 53. 
12 FM 3-24 2006, 1-40.  
13 See Owen 2011.  
14 FM 3-24 2006, 5-59.  
15 Ibid., 1-128 and 1-129.  
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maintain their connection to the population because it is what enables them to survive and 
expand. Current COIN experts share the same view. John A. Nagl reflects on the 
importance of dividing people the people from the insurgents: “Once the local and 
regular armed units are cut off from their sources of supply, personnel, and most 
importantly, intelligence, they wither on the vine or are easily coerced to surrender or 
destroyed by the security forces with the aid of the local populace.”16  
It is somewhat surprising that the Marine Corps and the Army were both 
relatively slow to establish formal teams for direct female engagement in Afghanistan, as 
population-centric COIN’s assertion that the population is the prize would dictate their 
need. Demographic data for Afghanistan is unreliable, but one estimate from 2007 holds 
that women comprise approximately 49% of the total Afghan population.17 In a 
discussion of the amount of popular support required for the counterinsurgent to win, FM 
3-24 notes that because of the ease with which disorder can be created, getting 51% of 
the population is not enough; rather, “a solid majority is often essential.”18 If we accept 
this premise, ignoring Afghan women would effectively doom any counterinsurgency 
strategy.  
In addition, military manuals dating from 2006 reference the importance of 
engaging women in COIN operations. FM 3-24 explicitly mentions the significance of 
winning women in Appendix A: Guide for Action, the manual’s outline of techniques 
necessary for successful counterinsurgency operations. A-35 emphasizes that women are 
a critical gateway for obtaining the support of families and in turn the populace.19 The 
                                                            
16 Nagl 2002, 28.  
17 Kumar and Raj 2007, 79.  
18 FM 3-24 2006, 1-108. 
19 Ibid., A-35. 
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United States Marine Corps’ Small-Unit Leaders’ Guide to Counterinsurgency, published 
in June 2006, also draws attention to the role of women in counterinsurgency operations: 
“Work to get them on your side and do not dismiss their opinion/influence.”20  
It would logically follow that to mobilize the population to isolate the insurgency 
one must first gain access to it. A respect for Afghan cultural norms requires that female 
counterinsurgents be used to interact with the Afghan female population. Afghanistan is 
not the only arena in which U.S. forces have had to use female military members to 
overcome challenges related to traditional gender norms in COIN operations. In Iraq, 
female military members were used both for search purposes through the Lioness 
Program during stabilization missions21, as well as in an Iraq Women’s Engagement 
Program. Even more so than Iraq, Afghan society is characterized by conservative 
cultural norms concerning gender. Underlying these norms is an unwritten legal code 
known as Pashtunwali, subscribed to by Afghanistan’s dominant ethnic group.22  In this 
tribal code, women play a symbolic role at society’s core and their honor must be 
protected. Adherence to the code is seen clearly in the strong division of gender roles and 
the tradition of purdah, or segregation between the sexes.23 This gender segregation is 
maintained both through women’s use of the veil and their seclusion in walled family 
compounds.24 Afghan females are also prohibited from communicating with males to 
whom they are not related.25 Due to the code of behavior associated with purdah, male 
                                                            
20 Small-Unit Leaders’ Guide to Counterinsurgency 2006, 45. 
21 The Lioness Program placed female Marines at tactical control points throughout the country to prevent 
insurgents from using females to smuggle contraband or act as suicide bombers.   
22 Abirafeh 2009, 108.  
23Barakat and Wardell 2002, 918.  
24 Moore et al. 2011, 4. 
25 USMC 2nd Expeditionary Brigade FET, 24.  
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counterinsurgent forces are barred from interacting with Afghan women; only females 
can access the Afghan females in a culturally sensitive manner. 
Moreover, advocates of the FET concept also argue that it is important to use 
military females—as opposed to government-employed civilians or women active in non-
governmental organizations, for instance—to access the female population because the 
outreach the teams conduct requires that teams patrol and operate in zones where the 
security situation is volatile. That teams are used in areas of operation with high threat 
levels should come as no surprise; as I discuss below, the teams are conceived of as a 
COIN tool that contributes to the establishment of security within a given area. While 
using female civilian counterinsurgents to perform many of the teams’ tasks might be 
ideal, this preferred division of labor is largely unattainable.26  
The first FET was an ad hoc Marine team created to support a 2009 cordon-and-
knock operation in Farah Province to detain two men involved in an IED attack.27  After 
the cordon was established, the commander leading the operation asked a village elder if 
female Marines, accompanied by members of the Afghan National Police, could search 
several houses.28 Once inside the homes, the FET distributed school supplies and hygiene 
products to the homes’ female Pashtun residents and spent several hours chatting with the 
local women, who proved remarkably receptive to meeting with female Marines.29 
Several days later, the unit and the FET returned to the village to clarify the mission of 
the Marines in the area as well as to deliver additional supplies.30 
                                                            
26 Watson 2011, 21.  
27 Mehra 2010, 22.  
28 Ibid., 22.  
29 Pottinger, Jilani, and Russo 2010, 1.   
30 Pottinger 2009.  
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 Following this team’s success in accessing the female population, a 2009 after 
action review penned by the team’s organizer, Captain Matt Pottinger, recommended that 
such teams be used actively as part of the ongoing American counterinsurgency 
campaign in Afghanistan: “The benefits (the acquisition of valuable information and the 
opportunity to positively influence an otherwise untouchable half of the local populace),” 
the review noted, “clearly outweighed the primary cost (having to take a handful of 
female Marines from their regular billets on a period, temporary basis).”31 Throughout 
the rest of 2009, Marine FETs continued to be assembled upon the request of maneuver 
units. From July 2009 to December 2009, it is estimated that ad hoc teams conducted 
about 70 short-term search and engagement missions.32 In March 2010, the first platoon 
of all female Marines trained as full-time FETs deployed to Afghanistan to work in 
Regional Command Southwest.33 The program has since expanded. Marine teams in use 
today consist of a non-commissioned officer who serves as a team leader and another 
Marine; when possible, teams are augmented with a female corpsman and a linguist.  
 The U.S. Army has also recently adopted the FET program. While the Army had 
identified a need for trained military females starting in 2004, the Cultural Support Teams 
(CSTs) initially created to meet that need operated only with Special Forces and Ranger 
units.34 It was not until January 2011, when the Army convened a three-day FET working 
group in Kabul, that a unified FET program was created that would assign all-female 
teams to units outside special operations units.35 Currently, the Army assigns FETs to 
each Brigade Combat Team (BCT) deploying to Afghanistan, as well as to each 
                                                            
31 Pottinger 2009.  
32 Center for Army Lessons Learned 2011, 4.  
33 Bedell 2011, 2. 
34 Lowe 2011.  
35 Center for Army Lessons Learned 2011 ,9.   
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Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT).36  Army teams, like the Marine teams upon 
which they were modeled, consist of two female Soldiers and are sometimes augmented 
by female translators and medical personnel. 
  
The strategic logic of female engagement 
 
 Both the Marine Corps and Army Female Engagement Teams have been justified 
as a critical instrument in commanders’ population-centric counterinsurgency toolboxes, 
with utility across the full spectrum of COIN operations.37  Flynn and Bras confirm: 
“Female engagement is not a side project; it is a critical element of population-centric 
COIN.”38 Intermediate goals of female engagement are as follows: women do not support 
or enable the insurgency; women influence their families and communities not to support 
the Taliban; and women influence family and community members to support the 
government of Afghanistan.39 The ultimate goal of FETs engaging with the population 
according to Lisa Brooks, a Research Psychologist with the U.S. Army Research 
Institute, “is to create stability and security in the region.”40 This is consistent with the 
causal logic of population-centric COIN, which advances that “winning over” the 
population contributes to a decline in the strength of the insurgency. It is worth noting 
that the preliminary goals for FETs listed above might be edited to include males as a 
direct target of influence, considering that the teams also interact with Afghan men. In 
fact, numerous military documents discuss how Afghan males may be more interested in 
interacting with military females than military males out of pure curiosity or because they 
                                                            
36 Center for Army Lessons Learned 2011, 9. 
37 I MEF FET 10.2 Deployment AAR 2011, 2.d.1 
38 Flynn and Bras 2010.  
39 Brooks 2010, 4; Wolfgang,25. 
40 Lisa Brooks, e-mail to author, March 2, 2012.  
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find military females less threatening.41 Nonetheless, I present below the rationale given 
for engaging with females specifically, as that underlies many of the calls for increased 
female engagement.  
The preliminary goals outlined above reflect the belief that Afghan women wield 
a large amount of sway in their families and communities: accessing the female half of 
the population not only matters in terms of increasing the sheer number of people who 
can be influenced by counterinsurgents, but is also critically important because of the 
nature of the role that women play in traditional societies. Defenders of the FET program 
contend that Afghan women exercise considerable influence within their communities as 
inter-family arbitrators, a fact that they believe has been underappreciated.42 While most 
insurgent fighters are men, and the conflict in Afghanistan has not seen as many female 
combatants as in Iraq43, women are extremely influential in the social networks that 
insurgents exploit. For example, counterinsurgency expert David Kilcullen, who has 
praised the FET concept, proposes that “winning” over neutral or friendly women in 
traditional societies “builds networks of enlightened self-interest that eventually 
undermine the insurgents.”44 Army Lieutenant Colonel Janet R. Holliday, in a piece on 
the essential role FETs can play, describes: 
 
 The coalition force use of females to break through cultural and religious 
barriers and misperceptions to reach Afghan women exhibits a show of 
trust and respect to Afghan traditions and Islamic values. Understanding 
and respect can breed cooperation, and when this cooperation spreads 
across families, a powerful tool emerges for fighting the insurgency.45 
 
                                                            
41 I MEF FET 10.2 Deployment AAR 2011, 2.d.3; Center for Army Lessons Learned 2011, 63. 
42 Pottinger et al. 2010; Mihalisko 1-2.  
43 Claire Russo, interview with author, February 22, 2012.  
44 Kilcullen 2011.  
45 Holliday 2012, 91. 
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In a paper titled “Opinion Dynamics in Gendered Social Networks: An 
Examination of Female Engagement Teams in Afghanistan,” Moore et al. more closely 
examine the theoretical justifications for engaging Afghan women, drawing upon opinion 
dynamics models. The group simulated an Afghan community through an abstracted 
network model, which captured the existence of strong social ties among Afghan women 
and generally lower levels of affective association and opinion propagation between 
males characteristic of Afghan culture, and modeled the effect of outside actors’ 
influences. The results the authors obtained through the simulation support the hypothesis 
that FETs, by extending contact to the female community within a population, “can bring 
about a greater shift in opinion than engagement teams who interact with the male 
community alone.”46 Moreover, FETs interacting with a female or integrated population 
were found to be significantly more effective at countering opposition influence than an 
allied team interacting with a fully male population at the 95% confidence level.47 
A specific and oft-repeated assertion put forth by advocates of the FET program 
encompassing ideas about women’s unique roles relates to the power Afghan women 
exercise within their families, particularly over their children. Women are not only 
primary caregivers, but also exert tremendous influence over the “career” trajectories of 
their sons. Drawing upon Sultan Barakat and Gareth Wardell’s observation that in 
Quranic teaching the mother is the gateway to heaven, and that sons in turn require a 
mother’s support before going to the front line48, FET proponents have emphasized that 
women are the difference between their sons becoming peacemakers or insurgents. 49 One 
                                                            
46 Moore et al. 2011, 9.  
47 Ibid., 9.  
48 Baraket and Wardell  2002, 919-920.  
49 Allen et al. 2010, 3.  
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2010 International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) document promoting the FET 
concept describes: “The fact that 44.6% of the Afghan population is under the age of 14 
underscores the need to engage the women who are the caregivers and thus primary 
influencers of the next generation in their youth, prior to and even during the attainment 
of fighting age.”50 In other words, FETs can leverage women’s roles within their families 
to limit the insurgency’s recruitment pool.51  
The primary means through which the teams develop and exploit relationships 
with the local population is by conducting presence patrols and engagements and hosting 
outreach events through the full spectrum of COIN operations. In the shape and clear 
phase, FETs have been used to establish early presence and reputation, form relationships 
with the local community and disseminate information, all in order to build trust and 
confidence.52 In the hold phase, teams have been used to engage the community’s entire 
population and demonstrate coalition commitment to the community. Teams hold shuras, 
another word for community meetings, and other humanitarian and civic action 
engagements, during this stage.53 During these events, it is common for FETs to conduct 
surveys that shed light on the problems facing a village population as well as that 
population’s propensity to support or not support GIRoA, which enhances their unit’s 
understanding of the total population picture.54 Information gleaned from previous 
engagements is later used in the build phase to shape targeted reconstruction and 
development efforts55, particularly those facilitating the development of women’s 
                                                            
50 Vedder 2010, III.  
51 Ricks 2009.  
52 I MEF FET 10.2 Deployment AAR 2011, 2.d.1. 
53 Ibid., 2.d.1 
54 Center for Army Lessons Learned 2011, 64. 
55 I MEF FET 10.2 Deployment AAR 2011, 2.d.1 
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political and economic opportunities.56 Reflecting on the Marine teams’ ability to extend 
influence over the population, Mihalisko describes, “By virtue of the role FETs perform 
[as outreach Marines], they serve as yet another platform to show local nationals that 
Coalition forces and GIROA work in the interest of the entire community.”57 
Heavily emphasized are the contributions that FETs can make across all phases of 
COIN to information operations (IO), broadly defined as efforts through which one side 
shapes the narrative of the conflict to gain an advantage over the enemy.58 While FM 3-
24’s information operations section is relatively short59, the manual argues that “IO make 
significant contributions to setting conditions for the success of all other LLOs,” or 
Logical Lines of Operations.60 Through medical, education, and civic outreach 
engagements, for instance, FETs may discredit Taliban propaganda declaring that 
Coalition Forces rape local women or disregard women’s role in Islam.61 In addition, 
once relationships have been established, teams can spread GIRoA and ISAF-friendly 
messages.62 A presentation on FETs compiled by the Marine Corps 2nd Marine 
Expeditionary Brigade Female Engagement Team asserts: “This war is a battle of 
perceptions. Every conversation with an Afghan has the potential to reinforce the 
message that the insurgency supporters are the enemy of the people, thus driving a wedge 
between the insurgency and the local population.”63 
                                                            
56 Ibid., 2.d.1  
57 Mihalisko.  
58 Exum 2010, 217. 
59 Hoffman (2007) notes that the lack of attention to the information dimension of counterinsurgency in FM 
3-24 may have occurred because Army and Marine doctrine in this area is “fairly solid” and the manual’s 
authors may not have felt the need to repeat information in existing publications.  
60 FM 3-24 2006, 5-19.  
61 Mihalisko. 
62 Ibid. 
63 USMC 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade FET, 15.  
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The focus of the engagements and outreach conducted by FETs varies by district 
depending on the perceived needs of the local population. A news article on the Army’s 
Task Force Lonestar Female Engagement Team describes, for example, how the team 
conducted visits to a local girls school in Farah.64  One former Army FET officer with 
whom I spoke described her team’s project to bring clean water to a community that had 
previously been collecting water from a contaminated drinking well; the team taught 
local families how to make small scale solar stills to address the problem until GIRoA 
fixed the broken pump.65 A deployment after action report (AAR) covering the second 
full-time iteration of the Marine program describes how FETs, using information 
collected from regular women’s shuras in Now Zad and Garm Ser, coordinated and 
planned for local women’s centers and projects to provide sources of income for women 
interested in working. All these activities are united in that they serve as ways for the 
teams to build local trust and confidence in the Afghan government and coalition forces 
so that local populations do not support or enable the insurgency.   
It is worth stressing that while FETs are believed to undermine the insurgency and 
contribute to security, they were not created to help counterinsurgent forces fight the 
enemy directly. Most significantly, the teams were not created to serve as intelligence 
assets or to be used for search purposes. The contribution of FETs to creating security in 
the districts that they work in is believed to lie in the engagement and outreach work the 
teams do: the teams show communities that they work in their interest, and through this 
encourage the local population to defect to their side, depriving the insurgency of the 
support it relies upon. As will be seen below, this distinction is sometimes not well 
                                                            
64 Hutchinson 2011.  
65 Anonymous, e-mail to author, January 24, 2012.  
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understood, and confusion about how FETs are believed to operate at times pervades FET 
assessment.  
 17 
CHAPTER II: The Female Engagement Team Assessment Model   
 
The FET puzzle  
 
Appraisals of the program by the military and media have been quite positive. The 
Army Commander’s Guide to Female Engagement, for instance, declares FETs to be a 
proven concept and notes: “The Marines accepted the FET concept early and employed it 
on a large scale well before the army. To their credit, they have had great success using 
it.”66 A deployment after action report on the second full-time iteration of the Marine 
FET program observes that FETs have been successful in districts of Helmand province 
in all stages of COIN.67   
FETs have also been the subject of a considerable amount of media coverage as 
well as the focus of several journal articles. For example, in a blog post, Tom Ricks 
remarked, “The bottom line is that done right, [the FET approach] works surprisingly 
well, with benefits among the population that can’t be achieved by males.”68 A recent 
article in Military Review by Army Lieutenant Colonel Janet R. Holliday declares, 
“Coalition forces are finding that one of the best ways to achieve strategic goals is to use 
female marines and soldiers to influence the family unit.”69 Another journal article by 
Michael T. Flynn and Roxanne Bras concludes, “FETs work.”70 
What is puzzling, however, is that both the teams and proponents of the program 
have a tendency to fall short of rational assessment of the program. Conclusions about 
FET success have been made in the absence of complete assessment of the program, 
which I describe below. For one to draw conclusions about the success of the FET 
                                                            
66 Center for Army Lessons Learned 2011, 3.  
67 1 MEF FET 10.2 Deployment AAR PPT 2011, 22.  
68 Ricks 2009. 
69 Holliday 2012, 90.  
70 Flynn and Bras 2010.  
 18 
concept, one must either adopt an extremely limited definition of what constitutes 
effectiveness, or make extensive and questionable assumptions about the relationship 
between female engagement and insurgency strength.   
 
Assessing the FET program  
 
The chain of reasoning through which FETs should function according to the 
justification for the program described in the previous section, is as follows:  
 
Engagement à influence among women and through women à decrease in the strength 
of the insurgency. 
 
 
As outlined in previous sections, the mechanism underlying the movement from 
engagement to influence is believed to be “hearts-and-minds”-style social and 
humanitarian provision and information operations: both are used to show Afghan 
females that coalition forces and the Afghan government hold their interests at heart. 
Having seen that counterinsurgents work on their behalf, Afghan women should 
influence others within their social networks not to support the insurgency as well. 
Driving the connection between counterinsurgent influence over the population and a 
decrease in the insurgency is the fact that as local populations turn to the counterinsurgent 
side, the insurgency finds itself deprived of its freedom of movement, its source of 
intelligence, and its resources, be they money or recruits.  
In the above model, engagement should be understood as an input. More 
engagement, provided that it is done “well,” should lead to greater perceived legitimacy 
of the government and coalition forces by the population, and in turn increased 
counterinsurgent influence among the population; that increased influence could be 
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viewed as an output. Finally, influence over the population should lead to a decrease in 
the potency of the insurgency according to the logic of population-centric COIN in which 
FETs are situated. After all, increasing FET influence over the population should prevent 
insurgents from maintaining connectivity to the population, which enables them to 
survive and expand. Measures that capture the strength of insurgency should be 
appreciated as outcome metrics. For FETs to be deemed a success, we need to have 
measured something at each of these nodes in a specific area of operation and appreciate 
a link between them. I discuss below how FET assessment to date has allowed us, if at 
all, to understand the chain I lay out above. 
In order to develop as clear a picture of FET assessment as possible, I gathered 
data from a number of sources. First, I acquired after action reports and reviews for 
several Marine FET deployments as well as reports on Army FET operations, which 
describe FET accomplishments, discuss lessons learned, and provide guidance for the 
future employment of the teams. Second, I interviewed members of the military and 
civilians who have been involved with the Marine Corps and Army programs. Among 
those I interviewed were officers-in-charge of FET deployments, non-commissioned 
officers serving on the teams, civilian advisors to the teams, and researchers involved in 
developing FET training packages and refining FET assessment models.  
My data has at least two limitations. First, while I was able to gain access to 
sensitive material on the program, I was not able to access classified material. Reports on 
individual team missions are classified to protect the identities of the Afghans referred to 
in them. I am nonetheless confident that I was able to develop a good understanding of 
how FET assessment has been conducted to date both through the reports I was able to 
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access and by asking those on the teams what measures of effectiveness they were 
tracking and reporting to commanders. Moreover, the reports that I was able to obtain are 
those covering multi-month deployments or long-term operations of the teams. These are 
the kinds of reports which one would expect to draw out FET assessment through the 
above chain. A second limitation of my data is that I have to treat my sources as 
anonymous at various points, and some of the information in the reports I cite is redacted.  
The following sub-sections reveal that FET assessment to date is not complete. 
Assessment centers heavily on tracking inputs. Indicators about the influence the teams 
have had are tracked inconsistently, and no reports on or appraisals of the program tie 
FET presence to a decrease in insurgent violence.  
 
The input: engagement with Afghan women  
 
As I mentioned above, engagement with Afghan women should be considered an 
input in any assessment model of the teams. Quantitative and anecdotal data on the 
program to date allow us to understand the engagement part of this puzzle fairly well.  
The military has been highly effective in tracking the numbers of engagements the 
teams conduct. A Marine Corps FET Deployment after action report covering the 
deployment of the first full-time FET from March 2010 to October 2010 notes, for 
example, that the teams conducted 3,136 engagements during 576 dismounted 
movements.71 The 10.2 Deployment After Action Report covering the subsequent Marine 
FET deployment to Helmand province from September 2010 to April 2011 also lists the 
number of missions the teams conducted, including a breakdown by type of engagement 
and a tracker of the numbers of different kinds of engagement over time. In the 
                                                            
71 I MEF FET 10.1 Deployment AAR 2010, 6.  
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PowerPoint accompanying that AAR, quantitative information is provided for each 
district in Helmand in which the teams conducted engagements. For instance, the three 
teams operating in twelve villages in the district of Garm Ser engaged 1,374 men and 727 
women. Over the course of the deployment, the teams in Garm Ser conducted 35 
women’s shuras and eight projects in support of women’s economic opportunities, as 
well as one health initiative.72 In the district of Nawa, one team worked in five villages. 
The team engaged 264 men and 379 women, coordinated two projects in support of 
female economic opportunities, and held one shura on Patrol Base Jaker, one of the 
Marine Corp’s bases.73 Interviews with more recent Marine team members reveal that 
numbers of engagements and projects continue to be reported. Like the Marine teams, 
Army FETs have started to report numbers of shuras and engagements to their 
commanders. 74  
We also have a significant amount of anecdotal data that confirms FETs have 
conducted outreach activities. For instance, the Marine Corps 10.1 Deployment After 
Action Report previously referred to describes how the teams conducted “enhanced 
medical outreach programs” in districts by providing medical assistance from the FET 
Independent Duty Corpsman.75 The Marine Corps FET 10.2 Deployment After Action 
Report describes how teams held women’s shuras in Now Zad and Garm Ser, allowing 
local women the opportunity to express the community’s needs and concerns.76 
Information gathered from those meetings was then used to develop projects to provide 
income sources for women interested in working. A separate after action review of the 
                                                            
72 I MEF FET 10.2 Deployment AAR PPT 2011, 12.  
73 Ibid., 13.  
74 Lauren N. Luckey, e-mail to author, January 28, 2012.  
75 1 MEF FET 10.1 Deployment AAR 2010, 6.  
76 I MEF FET 10.2 Deployment AAR 2011, 2.d.1. 
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deployment of a single Marine Corps team during the 10.2 deployment describes how the 
team was able to coordinate women’s clinics and schools in a highly kinetic area.77  
The ability of FETs to collect atmospherics and disseminate information is also 
suggested by anecdotes and numerical data. For example, Mihalisko summarizes how 
FETs sometimes accompanied a midwife sponsored by the Ministry of Public Health on 
her visits to new villages to inform female village members that she was able to see 
female patients.78 A report on Operation Da Khozo Hoqoq, a series of shuras that the 
PRT Nangarhar Female Engagement Team conducted as part of the 3rd Brigade, 25th 
Infantry Division’s “Elimination of Violence Against Women Campaign,” describes how 
Army FETs informed local women about the Afghan EVAW law to end harmful 
traditional violence against women as well as the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration 
Program (APRP) through presentations and by handing out tri-folds that the women 
could take back to their families and villages.79 To track the quantity of information 
distributed by the teams, it is not uncommon for FETs to report the number of 
informational items like brochures handed out to women attending events held by the 
teams.80 
While the answer to the question of whether FETs have been successful at 
accessing and engaging the population generally appears to be yes, not every team has 
had easy access and smooth outreach. For example, while Army FETs in Nangarhar 
province of RC-East enjoyed fairly open assess to the female population, their FET 
counterparts in Kunar province were unable to achieve the same access to the population 
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79 Goehler 2012, 9.  
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because the Afghan government’s Department of Women’s Affairs (DOWA)81 in that 
province did not want the teams to hold shuras.82  
How important are the data on the number and types of engagements the teams 
have conducted? The data are significant for at least two reasons. First, collecting data 
about numbers and types of engagement is a necessary first step in evaluating FETs. We 
would hypothesize, for example, that in areas where FETs have been deployed 
extensively, community satisfaction with COIN efforts and the Afghan government 
should be high, and insurgent violence should be low provided that we have accounted 
for selection effects. Thus, we want to have data on force lay down and their levels of 
efforts to engage the population.  
Second, the sheer number of engagements teams have conducted refutes the 
argument that community engagement would be difficult, if not impossible. During the 
program’s early stages, some members of the military had voiced concern that Pashtun 
men would be offended by the presence of American women and would not welcome 
them to engage with females in their families. FETs have generally not only been able to 
interact with local women, which male Marines and Soldiers had been unable to do, but 
also may be key in initiating access with the broader population. The 10.2 AAR 
describes, for instance, how locals in Sangin were initially unwilling to engage with 
coalition forces; the FETs were among the first forces to overcome this barrier and later 
became a key source for local atmospherics for the battalion.83 
                                                            
81 Departments of Women’s Affairs are branches of the Afghan Government’s Ministry of Women’s 
Affairs, a policymaking body created in 2002 with the aim of promoting women’s rights and advancement 
(Cortright and Persinger 2010, 8).  
82 Kristin Goehler, e-mail to author, January 30, 2012.  
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The data also show that the teams interact with high numbers of Afghan men. The 
same after action report described above analyzes the reasons for this positive reception 
among the male population:  
 
Due to cultural stereotypes and assumptions, Afghan men do not view 
female Marines with the same suspicions or skepticism with which they 
may view male Marines. In addition, since Afghan women are sheltered 
from society, the presence of women is a curiosity. As a result, men are 
frequently more unguarded with western women and are often even eager 
to speak with the FETs.84  
 
 
This phenomenon is discussed in many pieces on the teams as Afghan men seeing 
American women as a sort of “third gender.”85 
 
Have FET engagements influenced the population? 
 
While extremely low levels of engagement likely have little influence on the 
propensity of the local population to support GIRoA and coalition forces or the 
insurgency, we cannot automatically know if high levels of engagement are having the 
desired effect on the population. As one Marine who worked on the program notes, “A 
successful team may coincidently have a number of Shuras, patrols and/or engagements. I 
do not believe that the quantity of anything equates to success.”86 Kilcullen echoes this 
sentiment more broadly: “[Input metrics] tell us what we are doing but not the effect we 
are having.”87 It is not unimportant that the level of engagement over time is tracked, but 
one must remember that this information means nothing in isolation. It is necessary to 
continue assessment along the chain I identify in the beginning of this section.  
                                                            
84 I MEF FET 10.2 Deployment AAR 2011, 2.d.3. 
85 Center for Army Lessons Learned 2011, 4-5; Mihalisko.  
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Influence is undoubtedly more difficult to measure than levels of efforts to engage 
the population, but it remains absolutely essential to find and track some metrics that 
suggest that engagement has had some preliminary effect on the population’s interest or 
willingness to support the insurgency or GIRoA respectively, as this is mechanism 
through which population-centric COIN predicts the insurgency is weakened or 
sustained. As people are “won over” to the side of the counterinsurgent, material support, 
supply of intelligence, and supply of manpower to the insurgents should decrease, 
undercutting the insurgency.  
Indicators of progress at this nexus would be things like improved quality of 
interaction and greater support for FET-led initiatives. One of the critical things to note 
about understanding this step is that it not only requires that one determines some 
appropriate metrics, but also that one track them over time. Our ability to consider this 
link in the FET equation, particularly on the Army side, has been seriously impaired by 
shaky and inconsistent reporting procedures.    
Improved quality of interaction might be suggested by things such as better 
information and tip-offs on insurgent activity provided to the teams by the population, 
one indicator suggested by Kilcullen. 88 Advocates of female engagement frequently offer 
stories about teams receiving actionable information and intelligence. In northern Nahr-e-
Saraj, for example, a local man willing only to speak to the FET offered information that 
led to the discovery of five IEDs.89 An additional example of FETs receiving valuable 
intelligence is an instance in which a FET operating in Garm Ser received information 
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from an elder that led to the detention of three IED makers.90 Presented alone these 
anecdotes tell us very little. While it is, of course, positive that the teams are provided 
information that can be used to thwart potential insurgent attacks on NATO forces, these 
stories don’t help us understand anything about the utility of the FET version of 
engagement necessarily. Only if reporting captures the frequency of these tips over time 
as engagements increase can we gain a clearer view of progress in influencing the 
population in a specific sector.  
Some reports have attempted to establish trends over time. For instance, the 
Marine FET 10.2 Deployment After Action Report PPT presents data from which one 
can calculate that the the teams hosted 280% more engagements in January 2010 through 
March 2011 than they had the previous three-month period; enemy activity information 
collected in the January through March period was 152% higher than information 
collected during the preceding October through December period.91 To the extent that we 
accept frequency of tip-offs as a reflection of the local population’s level of support for 
GIRoA and the forces supporting it, it appears that increased FET engagement has 
exerted some influence over the communities they work in as predicted. That said, we 
should make this conclusion cautiously due to the problem of enemy adaptation. As 
efforts by FETs and other counterinsurgents intensify in a given area of operation, the 
enemy may launch more attacks in that area. Unless we track the number of attacks 
insurgents attempt to launch overall, which the teams do not do, we cannot know if more 
enemy intelligence received by the teams is a function of greater influence or simply due 
to the fact that violence levels are going up. In other words: is a greater percentage of 
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information on enemy activity being provided to the counterinsurgent by the local 
population, or is more enemy activity simply being reported because violence is 
increasing as a whole?  
More importantly, however, we should not view this as a measure of FET 
effectiveness, as the FET mission is not one of intelligence collection.92 While the teams’ 
occasional acquisition of valuable tactical intelligence does reflect the “every soldier is a 
sensor”93 slogan repeated increasingly within the U.S. military and should obviously 
increase the tactical initiative coalition forces hold in any given area of operation, this is 
not generally the mechanism through which FETs are conceived as contributing to the 
larger goal of undermining the insurgency to stabilize a given area. As they’ve been 
theorized through the paradigm of population-centric COIN, FETs undermine the 
insurgency by separating it from the networks on which it relies, not simply enhancing 
the ability of coalition and Afghan forces to react to insurgent activity. Data on the teams’ 
ability to collect intelligence should thus be appreciated as an indication of increased 
rapport with the community, and not as a measure of success of the program on a broader 
level. Moreover, I propose that reporting in this way may have unintended drawbacks, 
which I explore later in this thesis.  
Greater support for FET led-initiatives might be concluded from indicators such 
as increased rates of participation in programs led by the teams. The same Marine FET 
10.2 deployment AAR does attempt to capture the extent to which engagements have 
created support for FET initiatives. For example, in Marjeh, where five Marine teams 
worked, there was a 150% increase in female attendance for health initiatives the teams 
                                                            
92 FETs are outreach teams by definition. In fact, both the Marine Corps and Army caution against the use 
of FETs as collection assets.  
93 Magnuson 2007.  
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conducted.94 Assessing the extent to which FETs have influenced the population might 
also involve looking at the numbers of females attending seeking treatment at clinics, 
seeking legal services, or attending school95. In Garm Ser, for instance, schools in the 
district witnessed an increase in female school attendance. Female school attendance at 
the Shamalan Girls School was up 166%; another school in the district, Kharako School, 
saw a 200% increase in female attendance.96 Teams might also track things like the 
number of engagements that resulted in teams being invited to return to engage with 
women.97  
There is reason to doubt that Army teams have made any progress in tackling the 
“influence” part of the FET puzzle, as there has been little standardized reporting to date 
which would be necessary for one to develop any clear picture of the impact of FETs 
over time. For example, the final report on Operation Da Khozo Hoqoq dated January 
21st, 2012, which summarizes the “results” of seventeen shuras, was intended to serve as 
the template for all the other FETs operating in RC-East.98 The “results” discussed in the 
report, which cover the results of surveys used to gauge initial levels of knowledge of the 
law and program the FET sought to inform the women about and as well as the results of 
surveys to track a range of socio-demographic issues of interest to women, need to be 
appreciated as a way to shape further engagements and as a baseline from which to 
measure progress, which the report acknowledges up front.99 It is not surprising that 
reporting is just starting to be refined in the Army program; late last year the Army was 
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only beginning to codify the program, institutionalize service-wide training for FETs, and 
establish where the teams fit within command chains. 
The need to establish and track standardized measures of successful influence 
becomes even more clear if we consider that not all anecdotal evidence suggests FET 
interactions with the local population go smoothly. Alongside some of the seemingly 
positive indicators of FET influence discussed above, we also have a number of stories 
about FET engagement and initiatives flopping. An after action review of a team part of 
the Marine 10.2 deployment notes, for instance, that “the local community was 
indifferent to FET efforts to bring the community together or to educate the women in 
any way.”100 Media stories covering the work of teams have also described some less-
than-successful initiatives. One Public Radio International story on the Marine program 
shared the story of a FET operating in Helmand Province. One of the projects that the 
women launched in the village was the opening of a small school permitting girls to 
attend. Despite the FETs having communicated the idea to parents for months, when the 
four girls showed up for class on the first day of school, the teacher became uneasy, 
mentioning that the Taliban’s opposition to girls’ attendance might dissuade parents from 
bringing their children to school.101 Ultimately he asks the girls to leave. Another Marine 
team dispatched to a health center so offended Afghan women during their first visit by 
searching them at the center’s entrance in view of men that when the team returned for a 
follow-up visit, women avoided the center and the doctors asked the FET to go away.102 
Some of these missteps could be avoided with more thorough cultural training for the 
teams, but they nonetheless remind us that not all engagement is necessarily positive; one 
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Army FET member reflected, “It’s not always true that doing something is better than 
nothing.”103 
There is also anecdotal evidence that well-received outreach projects are 
sometimes not sustained when a transfer of authority occurs, which bodes poorly for 
“winning” over the population.104 Reflecting on a number of FET outreach initiatives, 
Marine Julia Watson notes, “There is a time and place for these efforts, but without key 
leaders in the community, and a unity of effort, these efforts have a short shelf life, create 
a society of dependency, and often fail once units leave the area.”105 These anecdotes 
remind us that initiatives and engagements have the potential to build unease and doubt 
among them population just as easily as they can build trust, and suggest that teams 
should also be tracking things such as failed follow-up engagements which might indicate 
failure to positively influence the population in support of coalition forces. 
 
Has the insurgency been weakened in the area in which FETs operate? 
 
The connection from influence over the population to a decrease in the 
insurgency’s strength, indicated in the equation above, is not touched upon in any of the 
reports or pieces lauding the program that I have encountered. After action reviews 
frequently allude to success, but that success is not tied in any way to improved security. 
For instance, an after action review of a team that worked seven months in a village as 
part of the Marine 10.2 deployment broadly notes that the team “was able to make an 
impact,” but only provides anecdotal accounts concerning how FETs were able to do 
things like show cultural respect during engagements with men and women collect 
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atmospherics data, work with a local female doctor to procure medical equipment and 
medication for her clinic, and identify so-called “impact” projects.106  
Moreover, those I interviewed confirmed that there has not been a study assessing 
the contribution of the teams to creating security. While it is certainly not the job of FETs 
to collect all the information required to capture overall trends in the insurgency within 
an area of operation, it is nonetheless worrisome that none of the pieces calling for more 
FET engagement have actually attempted to bring in measures of insurgency strength into 
their analyses, considering that this is so central to the strategic rationale behind the 
program. Moreover, reports that cover long periods of time, most notably deployment 
AARs, do not even acknowledge or highlight this assessment gap.  
“Winning over” the population only really matters because it is the means through 
which the counterinsurgent severs the link between the insurgency and the population on 
which it relies, thereby weakening the insurgency. Supporters of the program have argued 
that the teams, by influencing the population with whom they interact, encourage 
communities to turn away from supporting the insurgency and the Taliban, and can even 
limit the insurgent manpower pool itself. Moreover, proponents have argued that FETs 
have a kind of influence multiplier effect by tapping into the dense social networks 
women oversee.  Therefore, FETs should have some positive impact on the security 
situation over time in the districts in which they are operating.  
Numerous COIN experts have written on how the strength of an insurgency in an 
area can be approximated; those assessing the teams in the future have a wide range of 
measures from which they could choose. Metrics and indicators proposed by Kilcullen, 
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for example, range from the price of exotic vegetables107 to civilian accessibility, or the 
level at which civilians can move around their villages freely.108 Some researchers 
currently looking at the program have started to develop measures of effectiveness that 
would shed light on the strength of the insurgency in a given area. A draft document 
created during the 2011 meeting of a FET working group in Kabul proposing measures of 
FET effectiveness, which has yet to be implemented, lists a number of quantitative 
measures that could shed light on insurgency strength; these include the number of 
former-insurgent reintegrees accepted back into a given community, statistics on criminal 
activity including improvised explosive device (IED) explosions, and numbers of 
insurgent threats received.109  
So long as the employment of the teams remains slightly uneven because the 
program is in its early stages, one might also compare improvements in security in 
districts where teams operate to those in districts without the teams, or make comparisons 
in security across districts based on the number of teams operating in those districts. 
Carter Malkasian and Gerald Meyerle perform the latter in their assessment of the impact 
of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan, which were created to 
improve security through large-scale reconstruction. The authors ranked districts by 
degree of security change, based on shifts in a commander’s color-coding of the 
district110, as well as by the amount of PRT spending in a given district. They then ran a 
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Spearman’s Rank correlation to establish whether PRT spending was positively affecting 
security.111 
 Certainly, gauging whether FET interaction with the community is helping to 
establish security in a given area of operation is a more complicated task than conducting 
assessment based on input metrics. Beyond the issue of enemy adaptation raised above, 
one also encounters the problem of selection effects: teams are often employed in areas 
that have high levels of insurgent violence. Controlling for a district’s proclivity for 
violence thus becomes essential. That said, if we can’t show that engagement with the 
community works in terms of helping to create stability and security in a given area, we 
have no basis for thinking FETs are important for our warfighting strategy, let alone that 
they are a success.  
 
What are the acceptable conclusions about the program? 
 
 As the breakdown above suggests, we have a fair amount of information about 
FET efforts to access the population, incomplete and sometimes conflicting information 
about the influence the teams have had, and no real information shedding light on the 
final link in the causal chain. In other words, we have a lot of input metrics that reflect 
what we are attempting to do to influence the population, but no clear sense of the effects 
of those efforts, particularly in terms of the larger goal of undercutting the insurgency. 
From this, we cannot confidently conclude that the teams have been a success. After all, 
the very logic of population-centric COIN, which FET proponents invoke, is that 
influence over the population leads to a decrease in the insurgency.  
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 I argue that using the empirical data which teams have collected to date to 
determine that the teams have been successful requires that one make questionable 
assumptions both about the effectiveness both of “hearts-and-minds” approaches to 
COIN as well as the potential impact of “winning” women. It is not that the looking at the 
extent to which FETs have been able to access the population and hold engagements and 
outreach events with the population is unimportant. The problem lies in that these 
anecdotes and data don’t tell us anything about the success of FET as a COIN tool. In 
many ways, this is the same assessment problem associated with the “body count” 
measure used by American forces during the Vietnam War. The “body count” was a poor 
measure because it failed to give an accurate impression of the state of progress of the 
American campaign in Vietnam, as the link between killing more insurgents and 
defeating the insurgency was feeble. In the case of the FET program, unless we are 
convinced that our assumptions underlying the program are correct, we should refrain 
from concluding that the program has been a success for the time being.  
Accessing the population and engaging them “well” only matter insofar as they 
contribute to the strategic objective of undercutting the insurgency and increasing 
security. FETs do not, as they’ve been theorized, conduct female engagement for female 
engagement’s sake, just as the objective in Afghanistan is not simply to engage the 
population to conduct population-centric COIN. If measures of “success” for the teams 
focus heavily on the teams’ ability to access the population and to some extent whether 
that access has led to increased access, and not whether interaction has had any of the 
strategic benefits it is argued to have, the teams are always going to be successful by 
definition. Assessment becomes entirely tautological.  
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To be able to deduce anything about FET effectiveness we need not obsess over 
ensuring absolute precision in our data or methodology. We would, however, have to see 
some collected information embedded in some kind of narrative that takes us through the 
sequence of engagement à influence à decrease in the strength of the insurgency and 
that reveals some correlation between points in that chain. Only by unpacking this chain 
can we draw conclusions both about the success of the program as well as use FETs as a 
case study through which to test some of our assumptions about population-centric COIN 
more generally.  
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CHAPTER III: Problems Associated with the Current Assessment Model  
 
 The lack of complete assessment of the FET program could easily be dismissed as 
unimportant: the program, albeit less efficient, might still be effective overall. In this 
section I argue that the absence of an effective assessment mechanism for the program 
also carries with it great risks.  
 
The dangers of assumption 
 
It is not enough to assume that because a program corresponds on the surface to 
the model of population-centric COIN that we have chosen to apply in Afghanistan that it 
is actually working in light of the goal of suppressing the insurgency. Moreover, we have 
reasons to question whether FETs are offering both the tactical and strategic benefits that 
they have been said to. First, there has been continuous debate among military circles 
whether FETs are the preferred tool for this kind of engagement. Second, it is not clear 
that similar female engagement programs have worked historically in COIN campaigns 
to build sustainable trust with the population. Third, there is some evidence that the FET 
concept overestimates the amount of influence Afghan women exercise in their families 
and communities. Finally, historians have increasingly questioned whether “hearts-and-
minds” approaches were essential to previous population-centric COIN campaigns in 
general. The third and fourth points should be of particular concern to us, as it may help 
us understand the likelihood that that influencing women through engagement will 
manifests itself in a decrease in the insurgency.  
 
Are FETs optimal for female engagement? 
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 A number of people familiar with the FET program have questioned whether 
FETs are the best tool through which to reach out to the local female population. For 
example, one Marine Civil Affairs trainer argues that FETs lack the military occupational 
specialty to perform the tasks they are given:  
 
Setting up a sewing co-op for women when the vast majority of men in the 
same area are unemployed is a recipe for disaster; it is shameful for the 
women to have jobs when the men don’t. Further, doing health-related 
outreaches for a day or two, when there is a local doctor, midwife, etc. 
undercuts the long-term solution for healthcare, which is not us, but the 
locals. These are themes Civil Affairs Marines are aware of, whereas the 




In her study of gender-focused aid interventions that occurred in the aftermath of 
the Taliban’s fall, Lina Abirafeh raises some of the same concerns put forth by the Civil 
Affairs trainer. Many of the Pashtun women whom she interviewed through her research 
pointed to the connection between men’s honor and their roles as family providers, and 
stressed that initiatives should not be directed exclusively at women where men were 
without work. As one Pashtun woman described, “We don’t want men to be unemployed 
and without dignity. Their dignity will also bring us more freedom.”113 This is the very 
kind of awareness that the Civil Affairs trainer above argues is developed thorough 
intensive training, which many of the FETs lack.   
Another former Marine notes that FETs are not nearly as well integrated as other 
enablers that do similar work, like the Civil Affairs Teams referred to above.114 FETs, for 
instance, have just begun to coordinate with Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), 
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the Afghan government, and local NGOs, entities that Julia Watson asserts “bring the 
capacity for long-term sustainability.”115 The argument here is not that the underlying 
rationale for FET is bad— namely, that winning over the population needs to be an 
essential goal for counterinsurgents— but rather that FETs may lack the capacity to build 
and sustain relationships with the population long-term; there are other teams that can do 
the same work that FETs are engaged in relatively better, and our attention and scare 
resources should be directed towards strengthening those teams. One Civil Affairs trainer 
summarizes, “The juice isn’t worth the squeeze.”116  
It would be easy to dismiss the Civil Affairs trainer’s argument that resources 
would be better spent strengthening and enlarging Civil Affairs Groups as the result of 
inherent bias. Her argument may actually be worth exploring, however. One source cited 
Garm Ser and Musa Qala as good examples of villages in which FETs may have played 
an integral role in breaking the insurgency’s hold. These were also villages in which 
teams were partnered with Civil Affairs initiatives.117 In addition, some after action 
reviews authored by members of teams raise the very problem of not being sufficiently 
well-connected. One covering a team that served in Afghanistan from late 2010 to early 
2011 notes that the FET “found it difficult to start and continue progress with projects 
within the communities that would be sustainable because of the AO’s nomadic nature, 
and lack of coordination with other enablers.”118 
Another potential problem is that the program has not yet been replicated by 
ANSF, and the likelihood that it will be is extremely low. The United States and its allies 
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are involved in the conflict in Afghanistan as third-party counterinsurgents, and enabling 
the Afghan government to withstand U.S. departure and continue against the insurgency 
on its own if necessary has long been an objective. With the date for American 
withdrawal fast approaching, developing the Afghan government’s capabilities to take 
over the fight has been increasingly stressed. In a paper on gender integration in 
Afghanistan, Dr. Jack Kem and Lieutenant Colonel Frank A. Smith note:  
 
The FET concept fails to develop increasingly self-reliant Afghan security 
forces. Contrary to the strategic objective, it reinforces conducting 
unilateral and coalition-led operations. Understandably, a lack of capacity 
in the ANSF regarding female soldiers and police has limited their 
employment, but it must be considered as ISAF transitions security 
responsibility to the GIRoA.119 
 
While some teams have actually been involved in the training of female Afghan 
National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) forces, numbers of ANA and 
ANP females have been well below recruiting objectives.120 Moreover, the majority of 
female ANSF members are based in Kabul, not the rural provinces where insurgents 
frequently operate.121 Creating Afghan FETs would not just be a tremendous challenge 
because of the small numbers of women in both forces but also because of underlying 
cultural norms and gender expectations in Afghan society.122 Women currently in the 
forces primarily complete secretarial and administrative duties, and already face 
enormous threats while serving in this capacity. Between 2008 and 2009, for example, 
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three policewomen were murdered.123 Zoe Bedell describes how many female ANP she 
saw in Helmand Province had not told their families they were policewomen, and 
typically left their uniforms at work so not to be targets each time they went in: “The idea 
that you’re going to take women who can’t even walk to work openly or tell their 
families, their closest family members, what they do, that they’re going to go out and go 
door to door and sit down and talk with people… It’s a little far-fetched to me.”124  
One former Army FET Officer-in-Charge whom I spoke with did mention that her 
team had been accompanied by a female ANP officer on an engagement in Azam 
Kalay125, but this appears to have been a clear exception. The improbability of having 
ANSF FETs in the near future does raise questions about whether resources and time 
would have been better spent developing a tool for female outreach that would have been 
more sustainable.  
 
Placing FETs in historical context 
  
In addition to the above concerns, there is also reason to question the historic 
precedent invoked by champions of the FET program. The Army Commander’s Guide 
for Female Engagement cites the French use of Equipes Médico-sociales Itinérantes 
(EMSI), which translates roughly to mobile medical-social teams, during the Algerian 
war between 1954 to 1962 as one example of female engagement in the context of larger 
pacification efforts. The teams, which included both Army women as well as civilians 
such as doctors and social workers, provided sociomedical assistance to Algerian women 
as a medium through which to engage Algerian women and improve the reputation of the 
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French.126 Overall, the aim of the program “was to ‘expand’ women’s influence form the 
family to the larger society, but in accordance with ‘pacification’ objectives.”127 The 
Commander’s Guide hails the EMSI teams as a triumph: 
 
Feedback from French units highlighted the successes of EMSI, who saw 
the women as necessary ‘enablers’ that complemented their security 
actions (more than 350 EMSI settled in the whole theatre). The French 
Special Administration Section, established to work with the Muslim 
people, also found EMSI to be one of the most efficient ways to engage 
the population, and the large numbers of Muslim Algerian women who 




Among scholars, however, there is little consensus on the contribution of the 
EMSI program and its effectiveness. Matthew Evangelista, for instance, contends that the 
EMSI program and the larger strategy of targeting women was actually a failure: 
“Whatever the French military’s motives, the strategy of targeting women failed—
creating resentment among the males and provoking anti-French sentiment even among 
the females were the ostensible beneficiaries of the ‘enlightened’ colonial policies 
favoring women’s liberation.”129 Here we may in fact have an example of a program that 
garnered women’ initial acceptance and support, which manifested itself in increasing 
levels of participation in EMSI events, but which over the long-run influenced the overall 
population in a negative way and therefore did not serve larger pacification objectives.   
 
Faulty cultural assumptions: the role of Afghan women  
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A third reason to resist drawing quick conclusions about the program’s success 
relates to whether Afghan women assert the level of influence that the FET concept 
assumes. As formerly described, sponsors of the program are quick to point to the high 
levels of influence Afghan women exercise in their families and communities to support 
calls for increased engagement. For instance, one ISAF proposal cites the sway that 
Afghan women hold as “property owners, primary caregivers, arrangers of marriages that 
bind families, and inter-family peacemakers.”130 Another supporter of the program 
describes, “Afghan women know all of the going-on of their villages.”131 
One paper detailing the results of a research project between the Regional 
Command South West Marine Corps FET and the Human Terrain Analysis Team AF18 
draws more cautious conclusions. For the study, Marine FETs formally trained in 
conducting semi-structured interviews asked questions directly of Afghan men and 
women in their compounds in Helmand Province between February and March 2011 
aimed at determining patterns with respect to women’s levels of family influence. Sample 
questions included: Who makes decisions about household management? Do women 
have access to money? How do sons decide what they will do for work? Who makes 
decisions regarding children’s marriages? What is the role that a mother plays in child 
rearing?132  
Of the women interviewed in their homes, the most common response indicated 
full dependence on the husband for subsistence; all agreed that it was the responsibility of 
the man to provide all the resources required for the household to operate.133 For the 
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question of how young men decided to join either the insurgency or the ANSF, replies 
were mixed. One young man interviewed said that he would do whatever his mother 
instructed him to do. The report also notes, “Women stated that they had tremendous 
influence over their children because children spent 100% of their time with women.”134 
The officer-in-charge for the FET involved in the study, however, argues that this part of 
the write-up is misleading; many of the responses received indicated the opposite. 
Responses to questions concerning marriage arrangements also varied considerably: 
“Decision making for boys and girls betrothal partners rested solely in the hands of the 
father or the responsibility was shared between mother and father or the father made the 
decision with the mother’s approval.”135  
While the study should not be seen as definitive— it focuses exclusively on one 
province and responses could have been shaped by military presence— it does 
problematize some of the often-repeated assertions about women’s influence. To the 
extent that the FET concept relies heavily on assumptions and generalizations about the 
power exercised by women in the private sphere, the results of the collaborative study 
suggests that there may be a need to temper some of our expectations about what female 
engagement can achieve.  
Assertions about the influence Afghan women possess are not the only 
generalizations that proponents of the program have made. A piece by team founder Matt 
Pottinger, Hali Jilani, and Claire Russo quotes a man from a socially conservative district 
in southern Afghanistan: “You men come to fight, but we know the women are here to 
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help.”136 This quote has been repeated continuously in pieces written about the program; 
a cursory Google search reveals that the quote has been featured in two New York Times 
pieces on the teams, in a blog post by Tom Ricks on the Foreign Policy website, in a 
Washington Post Article, and a piece on the Department of Defense’s “DoD Live” 
blog.137 It is critical to remember that the quote reflects the beliefs of one Pashtun man 
who opened his home to a team during one FET patrol in one district of southern 
Afghanistan. It is possible that his statement reflects the beliefs of Pashtun men more 
generally, but we should be extremely wary of generalizing about all Pashtun men from 
this isolated statement.   
 
The fallibility of population-centric COIN  
 
A final reason to be more cautious in making conclusions about the success of the 
FET concept is that a number of works have questioned whether “hearts-and-minds” 
approaches were central to successful COIN campaigns of the past, and particularly 
whether “hearts-and-minds”-style persuasion was ever essential for breaking an 
insurgency. Though there is a lack of consensus within the field what exactly “hearts-
and-minds” constitutes, for the purposes of this thesis, I define a “hearts-and-minds” 
approach as one anchored in minimum force, social provision, and information 
operations.  
One piece engaged in questioning traditional case study analysis is Karl Hack’s 
piece “The Malayan Emergency as counterinsurgency paradigm.” Traditional accounts of 
the 1948-1960 Malayan Emergency, most notably John Nagl’s Learning to Eat Soup with 
a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, maintain that the British 
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campaign to defeat the insurgency turned in the 1952 to 1954 period, thanks to innovative 
new methods introduced by General Gerald Templar.138 One such innovation that Nagl 
devotes particular attention to is improvement in information operations. During the 
Templer years, he writes, a Psychological Warfare section of the Information Services 
was tasked with winning hearts and minds; its mission was both to persuade insurgents to 
surrender and to provide information as well as to convince the people that the 
government was capable of providing services.139 Hack disputes Nagl’s traditional 
breakdown of the Malayan insurgency, arguing instead that it was population control and 
security approaches that were most important in breaking the insurgency’s back. “Hearts-
and-minds” was not key until later, and played an essential role only once territory had 
already been secured.140 Hack’s interpretation runs counter to the emphasis on winning 
hearts and minds as means through which to establish security, a belief that factors 
prominently into justifications for the FET program.  
Authors like David Kilcullen and Peter Mansoor also caution counterinsurgents 
against confusing “hearts-and-minds” with the idea of getting people to like you. 
Kilcullen asserts: “The gratitude theory— ‘be nice to the people, meet their needs and 
they will feel grateful and stop supporting the insurgents’—does not work. The enemy 
simply intimidates the population when COIN forces/government are not present.” 141 
Mansoor similarly describes:  
 
[Counterinsurgents] would do well to remember the first rule of 
economics: anything free will be overused. In providing a civilian 
population with essential services and reconstruction assistance, it is 
                                                            
138 Also see Alderson 2010. 
139 Nagl 2002, 93.  
140 Hack 2009, 385. 
141 Kilcullen 2007. 
 46 
critical that military organizations force the people to make an active 
choice in favor of supporting the legitimate governing authority. 
Otherwise, any aid rendered will be accepted gladly, and have zero impact 
on the ultimate outcome of the conflict.142  
 
 
Buy-in to the so-called “gratitude theory” pervaded a few of the descriptions of 
the program sent to me by FET members in e-mail exchanges. For example, one former 
Marine FET leader, reflecting on how people used to joke about how FETs were “just 
there to pass out teddy bears and drink tea,” described:  
 
What FET did by passing out teddy bears and drinking tea, is that we 
offered something that the Taliban couldn't.  Kindness.  The Taliban's not 
passing out teddy bears, or conducting medical engagements, or asking me 
how I'm doing, or bringing me blankets, or bringing me food, or helping 
secure my village.  No, in fact that Taliban was/ is asking the villagers for 
all that stuff.143  
 
 
The impulse to “be nice” to the Afghan people is understandable, but FET leaders 
should make clear that the FET mission is not simply one of goodwill. Communicating 
this more clearly should be a priority for future FET leaders, as it will likely shape the 
approach for assessment adopted by the teams under them.  
 
Implications of the current model of assessment 
  
As I’ve described in the preceding section, one deficiency of the current model of 
assessment is that it fails to shed light on whether FET engagement has contributed to a 
decrease in insurgent activity within a certain area, and encourages us to rely upon 
extensive assumptions to fill assessment gaps. An additional shortcoming of the current 
model is that it may contribute to existing confusion about the FET mission or lead to 
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mission creep, defined as a shift away from or an expansion of a program’s original 
goals.   
 Among those measures included in sections on FET accomplishments in after 
action reports are the pieces of enemy intelligence collected and the number of times 
FETs were used in a search capacity. For instance, the Marine Corps FET 10.2 
Deployment AAR describes that the teams received 197 pieces of enemy intelligence 
during their deployment to Helmand province.144 The 10.1 Deployment AAR describes 
how FETs participated in ten cordon and search operations; one of these led to the 
discovery of an IED-making cell after FETs found a secret compartment in a room where 
women were being held.145  Teams part of the same deployment also searched 2,266 
women during operations at checkpoints. Similarly, the 10.1 AAR notes that FETs were 
used by ground commanders to search 353 compounds holding women during clearing 
operations over the course of their eight-month deployment.146  
  The problem with using these measures to show what the teams have 
accomplished is that these measures are not commensurate with the stated FET mission 
to build relations with Afghan women through engagement and outreach. Military 
literature on both the Army and Marine Corps programs explicitly state that the mission 
of the teams is not to conduct female searches; in fact, both the Army and Marine Corps 
have separate teams for this purpose. Nor is the purpose of the teams to collect 
intelligence. A document on the Marine program declares: “Female engagement teams 
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are not collection assets.”147  The Army Commander’s Guide asserts: “FETs are not 
intelligence collectors.”148 
 The issue is not simply that having FETs work in a search capacity and collecting 
intelligence is not how the teams are supposed to be employed; statements by those who 
have worked on or who have participated as part of the program emphasize that using 
FETs in these ways actually detracts from the teams’ ability to build relationships with 
local women. For one, using FETs to collect intelligence or search women, particularly in 
clearing operations, is likely to damage their legitimacy among the Afghan population. 
Zoe Bedell describes: 
 
One of the reasons the teams are so effective is that the people trust them. 
This is mainly for cultural reasons—they just don’t believe that women 
could pose a threat—but if you do anything to destroy that natural trust, 
the teams are going to become instantly less effective.149 
 
 
When used solely to engage with the Afghan population, FETs maintain 
somewhat of a “neutral” standing, allowing the population to feel comfortable working 
with the teams. Military literature is also outspoken on this topic. The Army 
Commander’s Guide to Female Engagement describes: “Cordon and knock operations 
are not a preferred use of FETs, as they do not allow women to establish necessary 
rapport with Afghan women.”150 A document on the Marine program similarly notes: 
“Female engagement initiatives that promote the use of females as collection assets can 
seriously impede engagement processes, scare women away, and put local women in 
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danger.”151 This point is echoed in the Army guide mentioned previously: “The U.S. 
military must understand that it would take only a handful of murder and intimidation 
incidents to completely and permanently cripple the FET’s rapport with local women in 
key areas.”152  
 Using FETs as collection assets hurts not only their legitimacy. Beyond this, 
many of those who have worked on the program note that using women for the purpose 
of intelligence collection could endanger the program as a whole. Two sources that I 
spoke with mentioned that if insurgents see that FETs are working as intelligence 
collectors they will begin to target or capture members of the teams. “If females are 
captured it would be a PR disaster,” one noted.153 Both sources also pointed to the level 
of resource expenditure that would be needed to respond to such a scenario, alluding to 
the example of Army Private First Class Jessica Lynch’s rescue by elite Special 
Operations Forces after her capture by Iraqi forces during the U.S. invasion in 2003.   
 Despite these cautions, the teams have clearly been used and continue to be used 
in such capacities. Continuing to report this use as an accomplishment of the teams likely 
aggravates confusion about the FET mission. Misunderstanding about the FET mission 
by commanders was an issue brought up by numerous team members and leaders with 
whom I spoke. Reports also raise this concern. Several after action reviews of Marine 
teams describe, for instance, how battle space owners’ lack of understanding about what 
the teams were to be used for resulted in delayed or incorrect FET employment.154 To 
some extent, it is not surprising that commanders would be confused about how to use the 
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teams if reporting on FET “accomplishments” includes details and anecdotes about the 
teams’ use in roles outside their stated mission.   
In addition, collecting and reporting data on what teams have done as collectors 
and in search capacities may lead to mission creep away from the intended use of the 
teams. While we typically conceive of a program’s mission and goals as shaping 
assessment, it is important to remember that assessment methods can also shape mission. 
Because reports have failed to acknowledge the shortcomings of these measures or the 
existence of an assessment gap, it would be tempting for teams and commanders to see 
measures related to the use of teams for intelligence collection and in search capacities as 
reflective of program goals and in turn use teams for those purposes. We have historic 
evidence that metrics can influence goals and approaches. For example, a report by the 
BDM Corporation titled “A Study of Strategic Lessons in Vietnam” reflects on the 
problems associated with the body count measure of progress: “The often warped interest 
in body count provided an inducement for countless tactical unit commanders to strive 
for a big kill (whether legitimate or feigned) in preference for providing security for a 
hamlet or village.”155  
If measures begin to contribute to mission creep in the middle of a deployment it 
could be particularly harmful. One Marine team after action review describes how 
commanders began to use the FET for so-called “collateral duties” in the later stages of 
its deployment, which prevented the team from being able to fulfill its central outreach 
mission. While the review does not describe why battle space owners began to use the 
teams differently, the observations made by the review’s author are nonetheless 
important. Reflecting on the team’s incorrect employment, the author of the report writes: 
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“[Being used in ways outside our mission] was a major issue considering FET had 
already conducted numerous engagements in the AO which had established strong ties 
with the local populace. The lack of patrols during the last month with (redacted) 
negatively affected those relationships.”156 Just as improper employment early on can 
preclude teams from establishing connections with the local population later, so to can 
improper employment later on harm those relationships already established, dealing a real 
blow to trust between the populace and coalition forces.  
Mission creep would not only likely produce problems for the teams on the 
ground in the short-run, but would also make it very difficult to distill what the real 
“lessons-learned” from the program are. Specifically, one externality of FET mission 
creep would be that it would hamper our ability to test whether FETs confirm the 
assumptions of population-centric COIN literature about the utility of “hearts-and-minds” 
approaches. As I have shown, the mission of the teams and the work they conduct as 
outreach teams corresponds well with “hearts-and-minds” models. Teams are believed to 
undermine the insurgency through “soft” approaches rooted in information operations 
and social and humanitarian assistance; they are not conceptualized as directly aiding the 
enemy-centric side of COIN operations. A shift in mission, particularly in the direction of 
using FETs to collect enemy intelligence, would mean that the team’s contribution would 
lie in helping counterinsurgents react to enemy activity, not fighting the enemy indirectly 
by cutting it off from its popular support base.  
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CHAPTER IV: Potential Explanations for the Current Model of 
Assessment  
 
If the previous sections are correct, and the current assessment model is not only 
inefficient but perhaps counterproductive, this raises the question of why so little 
attention and investments have been made in conducting better data collection and 
assessment. While this question is not the core focus of this thesis, it is nonetheless 
something that was raised in my interviews and exchanges with sources and merits 
consideration.   
The data I’ve collected provides support for two hypotheses regarding the use of 
metrics. First, there is a cultural-psychological explanation: because evaluators and 
proponents of the program have bought into the theory of population-centric COIN, they 
assume that the mere presence of engagement indicates good outcomes. In his discussion 
of the intelligence failure concerning Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, Robert Jervis 
reflects on the many phenomena that contributed to characterizations of the Iraqi WMD 
program by a wide range of intelligence services and most private analysts. Among these 
are confirmation bias157, lack of consideration of alternative hypotheses, and insufficient 
imagination.158   
All of these may be at work in the FET case. For example, one potential 
explanation for the inputs-heavy model of assessment is that members of the teams and 
advocates of the program strongly believe that their assumptions about the program and 
the larger paradigm in which it is situated hold true. Central assumptions and alternatives 
are therefore never re-examined or explored. If one is confident that the majority of 
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historical evidence upholds the idea that hearts-and-minds outreach increases security, 
measuring adherence to believed “best practices” might be a viable form of assessment. 
As I illustrate in a previous section, however, we should resist accepting the link between 
hearts-and-mind outreach and security as a given.  
Second, there is evidence for bureaucratic politics explanations as well. 
Bureaucratic politics explanations stress how government actors’ interests in promoting 
their own agency’s special interests can motivate decision-making. As Jack Snyder 
argues in his study of World War I, militaries build and justify doctrine not only based 
upon a doctrine’s effectiveness, but on the basis of securing bureaucratic autonomy, 
prestige, and resources.159 Several sources mentioned that the teams favor tracking 
quantitative inputs such as number of engagements and outreach events because it is a 
way to secure money for the program. Thus, just as Snyder argues that offensive 
strategies were preferred by major powers in the lead-up to World War I because such 
strategies best suited the needs of military organizations, so may certain models of 
assessment serve the military’s interests more than others. Specifically, inputs-focused 
models of assessment may help organizational actors secure necessary resources and 
capabilities. There is historical evidence for bureaucratic politics driving such metrics as 
well. A similar phenomenon appears to have occurred during the Vietnam War; the BDM 
study on the Vietnam War referenced above describes how the allocation of combat 
support assets was strongly influenced “by relative standings in racking up a high body 
count.”160   
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Measuring effectiveness primarily through inputs is also an undeniably attractive 
way to create an impression of progress in the eyes of the American people. As one 
Soldier describes, measuring inputs is “a way for leadership to show the public what 
we're doing in real, time-now, data to make them feel better about American Service men 
and women overseas.”161 This position is also consistent with Snyder’s observation that 
military institutions favor actions that enhance their self-image. Snyder describes, for 
instance, how one consideration that factors into a military organization’s selection of 
doctrine is whether it olds “the promise of a demonstrable return on the nation’s 
investment in military capability.”162 Though I argue that the assessment model actually 
fails to track the right indicators of FET contribution to the larger goal of undermining 
the insurgency in Afghanistan, one can appreciate how measuring inputs might 
nonetheless be an easy way to create a sense of progress, however artificial.  
There is little reason to believe that the cultural-psychological and bureaucratic 
politics forces I identify above are only shaping assessment of the FET program. Sub-
optimal assessment likely occurs in other programs that form part of the United States’ 
population-centric COIN strategy in Afghanistan for several reasons. First, poor 
assessment due to both forces has occurred historically, as I point out above with the 
example of the Vietnam War. Second, the FET program is a relatively small program; the 
second full-time Marine iteration of the program, for example, consisted of only 47 
Marines total.163 If securing money plays a key role in shaping assessment models for a 
relatively low-budget program, we would not predict the military to eschew opportunities 
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to secure greater autonomy and resources through the its other COIN programs, many of 
which are significantly larger.  
That conclusions about the success of the program have been put forth so quickly 
is not surprising. There is reason to believe that pressure to preemptively declare the 
“success” of a program may be unusually high in the case of the FET program, even if 
those making such claims are aware of the shortcomings of the current model of 
assessment. For example, a number of team members whom I interviewed hinted at male 
commanders’ resistance to the idea of females accompanying infantry units. Reasons for 
this could have something to do with male military culture, or they might relate to legal 
concerns; after all, military statute bars women from combat units.164 The difficulty 
associated with selling the concept to commanders for these reasons may increase 
incentives to make early conclusions about success to allude to in pitches to commanders. 
In addition, serving on a FET is often a secondary, informal job for women. Because 
devoting time to the FET program takes a woman away from her primary job, or Military 
Occupational Specialty (MOS), “Some teams have had to continually fight with their 
chain of command to allow them to continue to conduct operations.”165 The more 
“successful” one can paint the program to be, the easier it would presumably be for one 
to convince those in one’s chain of command to grant one time to devote to the FET 
mission.  
A final reason why there may be high incentives to declare the FET program a 
success even in the absence of good assessment relates to the attention the teams have 
received in the context of the debate about relaxing restrictions on women in combat. The 
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wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have fueled calls to lift some of the current restrictions, with 
many arguing that that those prohibitions are irrelevant due to the absence of clear 
frontlines in both conflicts. Because the FET program sends female teams out with male 
infantry units, it has understandably received much scrutiny in light of this larger, 
ongoing discussion. One of the arguments that has historically been raised in opposition 
to extending combat roles to women is what Lucinda Peach calls “the efficiency 
rationale.” Part of this argument involves the purported lesser effectiveness of female 
soldiers.166 Pointing to the effectiveness of a program that involves female Soldiers and 
Marines may by seen by those in favor of rescinding or changing current policies as a 
means through which to bolster their argument. 
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Conclusion 
I maintain that we lack an effective assessment mechanism for the FET program 
to date. Anecdotal and quantitative data that have been collected to date are necessary for 
better conclusions about the program to be made in the future, but they are hardly 
sufficient for conclusions about success to have been made. While FETs generally appear 
thus far to have been a good tool for interacting with what had previously been an 
overlooked half of the Afghan population, concluding that FETs are a success requires 
one to make significant assumptions, both about the impact of those engagements and 
their relevance in terms of the larger goal of defeating the insurgency in Afghanistan. 
Assertions that the program is a success should thus be met with some skepticism.  
Despite the existence of unique incentives for quick conclusions about success for 
the FET program, I suspect that the assessment puzzle that I’ve identified is characteristic 
of a number of other COIN programs in Afghanistan. What is critical to remember is that 
COIN, by definition, is those actions taken by a government to defeat an insurgency. The 
United States’ objective in Afghanistan is to support GIRoA in defeating the insurgency 
in Afghanistan through a population-centric COIN approach. Winning over the 
population is a method through which to defeat an insurgency; it is not an end-goal in and 
of itself. Assessments of programs need to reflect an appreciation of this fact; progress 
needs to be thought about in relationship to the ultimate goal. Where assessment is not 
tied to a decrease in the insurgency, those conducting program assessment should make it 
clear how they define success: is one simply talking about tactical success, or even just 
about the successful implementation of a program, for example?  
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Conducting assessment in a counterinsurgency campaign is a daunting challenge, 
and is a problem that has no doubt been exacerbated by a lack of guidance on how to do 
assessment in COIN in formal publications.167 Measuring the contribution of any 
individual COIN program or initiative towards progress towards the larger operational 
goal is even more difficult. In any given area of operation, numerous teams are being 
employed and numerous projects are being undertaken; a seemingly infinite number of 
variables could be influencing an insurgency within a particular zone. Moreover, one will 
inevitably be forced to awkwardly blend quantitative and qualitative measures of 
progress into some mash-up indicators. All things considered, it is absolutely true that 
one is never going to achieve full mathematical rigor and precision in COIN assessment. 
Nonetheless, a counterinsurgent should seek to identify and gather a few metrics and 
indicators of progress over time related to one’s program that can later be linked to trends 
in the insurgency.168 The difficulty of COIN assessment is not an excuse not to do it.  
I also maintain that refining our assessments of FETs may be a particularly 
worthwhile and useful exercise through which to shed light on the benefits and 
limitations of population-centric “hearts-and-minds” approaches at a time when they’ve 
become increasingly questioned. First, female engagement opens access to an entire half 
of the population with whom contact before had largely been intermittent. In addition, 
FETs have been upheld as key enablers of positive unit interaction with the community as 
a whole; the teams have been presented as both friction reducers and sources of cultural 
understanding for unit commanders that can be used to improve relations between the 
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military and the local population more largely.169 Advocates of female engagement also 
suggest that FETs, by working through well-networked women, have a kind of influence 
multiplier effect. Regardless of whether one accepts every single one of the claims made 
by proponents of the program about the teams’ potential and the role of Pashtun women, 
one can easily appreciate that population-centric COIN theory would predict that the 
teams would be a hugely significant capability.  
Unfortunately, the opportunity to refine our assessment of FETs both to better 
understand the impact of the program as well as the paradigm through which it is has 
been justified is rapidly fading. U.S. and NATO partners have recently finalized 
agreements to wind down the war in Afghanistan, and President Obama plans to clarify 
American withdrawal plans at the NATO summit meeting in Chicago in May.170 As the 
U.S. and its allies finalize plans to leave the country, one can expect greater attention to 
be devoted to force protection. This was certainly the approach encouraged by the Nixon 
administration during the final stages of the Vietnam War. The administration’s so-called 
“Vietnamization” policy placed great emphasis on reducing American lethality, or the 
probability that an individual American deployed in Vietnam would die in combat.171 
Reducing the risk of death faced by American troops was seen as an essential part of 
ending the war honorably in the public’s eyes. Reflecting on the likely shift in the 
direction of force protection that coalition forces will make in Afghanistan, one source 
noted, “No one wants to hear about casualties in a war that we have already decided 
we’re getting out of.”172 Initiatives that involve coalition forces working in local 
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communities, including female engagement, will likely decrease in order to minimize the 
exposure of Marines and Soldiers to potential harm.  
In light of political developments, champions of the FET program may thus have 
done themselves a great disservice by failing to develop useful measures of FET 
effectiveness early. Several women with whom I spoke noted that they did not believe the 
program is sufficiently rooted within the military. One noted, “[FETs] are not, in my 
mind, cemented into the army, so I could see them being dismantled after 
Afghanistan.”173 While current measures of assessment may serve some short-term goals 
like securing money for the program, they neither cover the relation of the teams to larger 
strategic goals nor help us unpack the mechanisms through which the teams work. 
Current assessments of the program will thus not be very useful for those arguing either 
to maintain this capability for future COIN operations or to reconstitute similar teams in 
the early stages of a similar conflict. This case of FETs may ultimately emerge as a 
cautionary tale against delaying good assessment.  
 While this thesis has called into question the reasoning behind assertions that the 
FET program has been a success, it does not answer the question of whether FETs 
contribute to the end goal of undermining the insurgency within a given area and 
improving security. My assertion that proponents of the program have not made a 
persuasive case that the program has undermined the insurgency within a given area in 
the way they’ve been described to should not be understood as an argument that the 
teams have been a failure. Coming to that conclusion would entail tracking the same 
kinds of trends necessary to establish success that proponents of the program have yet to 
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incorporate in their assessments of the teams. Doing so here is impossible because data 
on security for specific areas are largely classified.  
This thesis is also not an argument against the tactical or strategic employment of 
women in warfare. Even if some of the military’s assumptions about the utility of FETs 
as a strategic asset in population-centric COIN in Afghanistan are ultimately disproven, 
there are countless other ways in which military females could prove useful in future 
American military operations. A former Army officer who worked on the FET program 
notes, for example, that military females attached to infantry units have proved extremely 
useful in calming gender sensitivities during more kinetic activities.174 It is also possible 
that using female counterinsurgents on small teams like this represents the best relative 
use of women in counterinsurgency operations even if the teams have not contributed to 
defeating the insurgency in the way their advocates and population-centric theory 
assume. 
 This project does serve as a reminder of the need to think more critically about 
how we conceptualize and measure success in a counterinsurgency campaign. My 
argument that assessment ought to have something to do with desired outcomes is hardly 
radical. Counterinsurgents’ propensity to overlook it, however, makes it worth repeating. 
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